Allocation Mechanisms, Asymmetric Information and the ‘Revelation Principle’

Milton Harris and Robert M. Townsend

Chapter 11 in Issues in Contemporary Microeconomics and Welfare, 1985, pp 379-394 from Palgrave Macmillan

Abstract: Abstract The purpose of this chapter is to explain a new approach for predicting both the allocation of resources and the resource allocation mechanism in certain environments in which agents are asymmetrically informed prior to any trading.1 We illustrate this approach by applying it to a simple pure-exchange environment in which an information asymmetry is present.

Keywords: Optimal Allocation; Asymmetric Information; Prior Belief; Allocation Rule; Indifference Curve (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 1985
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:pal:palchp:978-1-349-06876-0_11

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DOI: 10.1007/978-1-349-06876-0_11

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