Information and Incentives in Designing Non-wasteful Resource Allocation Systems

Leonid Hurwicz

Chapter 3 in Issues in Contemporary Microeconomics and Welfare, 1985, pp 125-168 from Palgrave Macmillan

Abstract: Abstract Economists are not always willing to confine themselves to the analysis of what exists, because they regard the economic structure as subject to conscious modification, by legislation as well as other techniques. If one is willing to consider such modifications, one must study their feasibility, and it becomes natural to develop a set of criteria by which to judge their desirability.

Keywords: Resource Allocation; Nash Equilibrium; Outcome Function; Stationary Message; Message Space (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 1985
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DOI: 10.1007/978-1-349-06876-0_3

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