Repeated Games

Robert Aumann

Chapter 5 in Issues in Contemporary Microeconomics and Welfare, 1985, pp 209-242 from Palgrave Macmillan

Abstract: Abstract Work on repeated games may be broadly divided into two categories: repeated games with complete information, and repeated games with incomplete information. While there are important interrelationships between these two categories, each one represents a coherent and more or less separate body of work with its own set of basic ideas and problems. A closely related area is that of stochastic games, but this will not be surveyed here.

Keywords: Equilibrium Point; Game Theory; Incomplete Information; Mixed Strategy; Pure Strategy (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 1985
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DOI: 10.1007/978-1-349-06876-0_5

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