Reconsideration of Duopoly Theory: A Co-operative Perspective

Mordecai Kurz

Chapter 6 in Issues in Contemporary Microeconomics and Welfare, 1985, pp 245-280 from Palgrave Macmillan

Abstract: Abstract Ever since Cournot’s (1838) celebrated treatment of the duopoly problem, the model of two firms in an industry has provided an important and fertile ground for the examination of the foundations of market behaviour. The duopoly level is the simplest situation that brings up the fundamental issues involved in formulating the market behaviour of firms and these include the nature of the strategies employed, the effects of dynamic considerations, the concept of ‘reaction’ of one firm to the actions of the other, the importance of information, the influence of entry considerations and others. Such celebrated contributions as Bertrand (1882), Edgeworth (1925), Hotelling (1929), Chamberlin (1933), Stackelberg (1934), Feltner (1949), Mayberry, Shubik and Nash (1953) and Shubik (1955, 1959, 1968, 1974) provide only a small sample of papers that highlight the various aspects of the duopoly problem.

Keywords: Nash Equilibrium; Transfer Payment; Strategy Space; Strategic Option; Implicit Contract (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 1985
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DOI: 10.1007/978-1-349-06876-0_6

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