The New Classical Economics—A Game-theoretic Critique

Henry Y. Wan

Chapter 9 in Issues in Contemporary Macroeconomics and Distribution, 1985, pp 235-257 from Palgrave Macmillan

Abstract: Abstract From the game-theoretic perspective, the ‘new classical economics’ has elevated macroeconomic debates to a new peak of sophistication. Discussions are conducted in such terms as rational agents, equilibrium strategies, information structures and agent-government interactions. None the less, in any analytic treatment of an applied problem, neither the sophistication of problem formulation, nor the rigour of reasoning is sufficient to validate the conclusions. Specifically, whether the assumptions postulated are appropriate to the substantive issues must be weighed with methodical care. In this context simplifying assumptions may be harmless, but the omission of some essential mechanism is a completely different matter. In this study, we shall explore the conceptual foundations underlying the ‘new classical economics’.

Keywords: Nash Equilibrium; Monetary Policy; Business Cycle; Government Policy; Optimal Policy (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 1985
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:pal:palchp:978-1-349-06879-1_9

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DOI: 10.1007/978-1-349-06879-1_9

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