The Concept of the Weight of Argument

R. M. O’Donnell
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R. M. O’Donnell: Macquarie University

Chapter 4 in Keynes: Philosophy, Economics and Politics, 1989, pp 67-80 from Palgrave Macmillan

Abstract: Abstract The novel concept of ‘the weight of argument’ forms a significant element in Keynes’s philosophy and has a particular bearing upon his economics. Although it was somewhat hesitantly advanced in the TP, he lent further importance to it in his economic writings after 1930, even if it remained in the background or was concealed by proxies such as ‘confidence’. Its general significance lies in its relevance to his theory of rationality under uncertainty, its particular significance in the light it casts on uncertainty and liquidity in the GT.

Date: 1989
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:pal:palchp:978-1-349-07027-5_5

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DOI: 10.1007/978-1-349-07027-5_5

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