Epistemology

R. M. O’Donnell
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R. M. O’Donnell: Macquarie University

Chapter 5 in Keynes: Philosophy, Economics and Politics, 1989, pp 81-105 from Palgrave Macmillan

Abstract: Abstract It is now time to support the claim that Keynes was philosophically a rationalist and to explain in what sense this is meant. There are, of course, varieties of rationalism, and Keynes’s own phrase ‘Cambridge rationalism’ might conveniently be used to distinguish his from other versions. Some may prefer the label intuitionist, but little hangs on the difference provided it is understood in a rationalist context. My basic thesis, epistemologically speaking, is that Keynes is a particular kind of rationalist rather than an empiricist or pragmatist.

Keywords: Logical Relation; Rational Belief; Direct Knowledge; Direct Acquaintance; Probable Knowledge (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 1989
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:pal:palchp:978-1-349-07027-5_6

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DOI: 10.1007/978-1-349-07027-5_6

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