Monitoring Performance

A. J. Harrison

Chapter 5 in Strategic Planning in Nationalised Industries, 1984, pp 102-111 from Palgrave Macmillan

Abstract: Abstract The case for external monitoring is simply put: nationalised industries, because they are not subject to commercial pressures and the fear of default, do not have strong incentives to be efficient. In the case of the monopolies, pressure exerted through EFLs runs the risk of pushing over on to prices; in the case of loss-makers, the pressures are considerable, but the management is inclined to politicise the relationship and concentrate on making the case for more grant, rather than getting on with the job of cutting costs. External efficiency audit is a proxy for market pressure.

Keywords: Monitoring Performance; Public Body; External Audit; Public Money; External Monitoring (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 1984
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DOI: 10.1007/978-1-349-07114-2_6

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