Rational Learning and Rational Expectations

Margaret Bray and David Kreps

Chapter 19 in Arrow and the Ascent of Modern Economic Theory, 1987, pp 597-625 from Palgrave Macmillan

Abstract: Abstract Much recent work in the economics of information has stemmed from the observation that demand functions, and therefore prices, reflect agents’ private information. Given an adequate understanding of the relationship between private information and equilibrium prices, it is possible to infer some or all of the private information. It seems natural to suppose, therefore, that agents will endeavour to use the information contained in equilibrium prices.

Keywords: Rational Learning; Private Information; Equilibrium Price; Rational Expectation; Multiple Equilibrium (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 1987
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DOI: 10.1007/978-1-349-07239-2_19

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