On Reconciling Arrow’s Theory of Social Choice with Harsanyi’s Fundamental Utilitarianism

Peter Hammond

Chapter 4 in Arrow and the Foundations of the Theory of Economic Policy, 1987, pp 179-221 from Palgrave Macmillan

Abstract: Abstract The last paragraph of Kenneth Arrow’s Nobel Lecture is characteristic of the man: The philosophical and distributive implications of the paradox of social choice are still not clear. Certainly there is no simple way out. I hope that others will take this paradox as a challenge rather than as a discouraging barrier (Arrow 1973a; 1974).

Keywords: Social Norm; Social Choice; Social Welfare Function; Walrasian Equilibrium; Pareto Principle (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 1987
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:pal:palchp:978-1-349-07357-3_5

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DOI: 10.1007/978-1-349-07357-3_5

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