Arrow’s Independence Condition and the Bergson—Samuelson Tradition

Murray Kemp and Yew-Kwang Ng ()

Chapter 5 in Arrow and the Foundations of the Theory of Economic Policy, 1987, pp 223-241 from Palgrave Macmillan

Abstract: Abstract One of the most controversial and widely misunderstood components of Kenneth Arrow’s pathbreaking work on social choice (1951; 1963) is the condition of independence of irrelevant alternatives (IIA). It is thus not out of place on the occasion of Arrow’s 65th birthday to re-examine that condition and some related issues.

Keywords: Public Choice; Social Choice; Welfare Economic; Individual Preference; Social Welfare Function (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 1987
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DOI: 10.1007/978-1-349-07357-3_6

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