The Theoretical Framework

Danny Hann

Chapter 3 in Government and North Sea Oil, 1986, pp 24-45 from Palgrave Macmillan

Abstract: Abstract Since the publication in 1957 of Anthony Downs’ An Economic Theory of Democracy1 the theory of public choice has expanded into a broader and more far-reaching analysis of the economics of politics and government decision-making. Work by economists such as Bergson, Arrow and Sen stimulated interest in the area of normative public choice and normative theorists tended to concentrate on the government’s objectives being ultimately to maximise some social welfare function. Although Arrow2 proved that given certain conditions a social welfare function will be impossible to locate there has nevertheless been a tendency to overlook the motivation of individuals involved in public decision-making and to assume conveniently that their sole purpose is to maximise some given social welfare function.

Keywords: Marginal Cost; Public Choice; Political Participation; Vote Rule; Social Welfare Function (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 1986
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:pal:palchp:978-1-349-08083-0_3

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DOI: 10.1007/978-1-349-08083-0_3

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