 Uncertainty and the Residual HypothesisChapter 7 in Inflation and Income Distribution in Capitalist Crisis, 1989, pp 123-132 from Palgrave Macmillan Abstract: Abstract A well-known criticism raised against the use of probability as a measure of uncertainty can be summarised as follows: it is very doubtful whether a single number (probability) has any meaning when it is attributed to events which are not repeatable or, in general, when the probability assessment is vague for whatever reason. In such cases the reliability of the evidence should also be taken into account in making decisions and assessed as distinct from the determination of probability. Keynes suggested the notion of ’weight of the argument’ as distinct from the notion of probability: ’New evidence will sometimes decrease the probability of an argument, but it will always increase its weight.’1 According to other proposals the reliability of a probability assessment can be measured by the probability of a statement of probability. This idea appears in the work of Reichenbach2 and a similar concept has subseyuently been proposed by J. Marschak3 and criticized by de Finetti.4 Keywords: Decision Maker; Prime Consequence; Bayesian Approach; Residual Event; Attribute Level (search for similar items in EconPapers) There are no downloads for this item, see the EconPapers FAQ for hints about obtaining it. Related works: Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:pal:palchp:978-1-349-08833-1_8 Ordering information: This item can be ordered from DOI: 10.1007/978-1-349-08833-1_8 Access Statistics for this chapter More chapters in Palgrave Macmillan Books from Palgrave Macmillan |
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