 Internal Pressures through Appointments and PromotionsEva Etzioni-Halevy
Chapter 9 in National Broadcasting Under Siege, 1987, pp 127-142 from Palgrave Macmillan Abstract: Abstract In all the countries studied there were implied pressures from the government on the broadcasting authorities through the staffing of the top supervisory positions and these have been dealt with above. This chapter is about similar implied pressures at lower levels. Originating in the political system — these are conveyed inwards by the boards or managements of the corporations themselves, in the form of politically-influenced appointments and promotions of broadcasting staff. Such appointments then have clear implications for the political content of programmes. For not only is it often (though not always) the case that political appointees will toe the line of their appointers or promoters, but those striving for appointments and promotions can be expected to do so as well. Officially, in all the broadcasting corporations studied, appointments and promotions are based on merit. But how do things work out in practice? Keywords: Internal Pressure; Political Affiliation; Political View; Political Consideration; Position Holder (search for similar items in EconPapers) There are no downloads for this item, see the EconPapers FAQ for hints about obtaining it. Related works: Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:pal:palchp:978-1-349-09077-8_9 Ordering information: This item can be ordered from DOI: 10.1007/978-1-349-09077-8_9 Access Statistics for this chapter More chapters in Palgrave Macmillan Books from Palgrave Macmillan |
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