Operational Rules

David Reisman

Chapter 3 in The Political Economy of James Buchanan, 1990, pp 31-53 from Palgrave Macmillan

Abstract: Abstract Democracy, Buchanan believes, better reflects individuals’ preferences than does any of the well-known alternatives such as the military junta, the single party dictatorship, the elitist ruling committee, or the benevolent depot with a propensity to play at being God. Politics being a process of discovery aimed at identifying the ‘public good’, the advantage of the democratic mode of search-activity is that it seeks to consult the maximum feasible constituency and to reconcile the separate interests of the largest possible number of social actors. The task is not an easy one given the quintessential individuality of the participants in the drama of collective action and Buchanan’s repeated assertion that the ‘public interest’ is nothing other than ‘what the individual says it is. Moreover, each individual will have a meaningful conception of what he conceives to be the public interest; there will be as many social-welfare functions as there are individuals in the group.’1

Keywords: Political Economy; Pareto Optimality; External Cost; Operational Rule; Simple Majority (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 1990
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DOI: 10.1007/978-1-349-10519-9_3

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