A Charter for Democrats

David Reisman

Chapter 5 in The Political Economy of James Buchanan, 1990, pp 74-96 from Palgrave Macmillan

Abstract: Abstract Institutions exist which encourage rather than repress moral and constitutional anarchy. Politicians and bureaucrats neither possess nor are seen to possess much sense of the ‘national interest’, decision-making rules open the door to vested interests while reinforcing popular perceptions of powerlessness, and Keynesian economics is an unhealthy combination of irresponsible attitudes and unenforceable contracts. Clearly, institutions can and do evolve which no convinced democrat ought to regard with equanimity: ‘I have no faith in the efficacy of social evolutionary process. The institutions that survive and prosper need not be those that maximize man’s potential. Evolution may produce social dilemma as readily as social paradise.’1 Economists such as Hayek have argued in effect that ‘basic institutional change will somehow spontaneously evolve in the direction of structural efficiency’.2 They have done, in Buchanan’s words, ‘great damage’: My basic criticism of F.A. Hayek’s profound interpretation of modern history and his diagnosis for improvement is directed at his apparent belief or faith that social evolution will, in fact, insure the survival of efficient institutional forms. Hayek is so distrustful of man’s explicit attempts at reforming institutions that he accepts uncritically the evolutionary alternative. We may share much of Hayek’s skepticism about social and institutional reform, however, without elevating the evolutionary process to an ideal role. Reform may, indeed, be difficult, but this is no argument that its alternative is ideal.3

Keywords: Political Economy; Social Contract; Public Spending; Constitutional Rule; Unanimity Rule (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 1990
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DOI: 10.1007/978-1-349-10519-9_5

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