 Search, Applications and VacanciesSteven Stern Chapter 1 in Advances in the Theory and Measurement of Unemployment, 1990, pp 5-19 from Palgrave Macmillan Abstract: Abstract Over the last few years the efficiency of search equilibria has been examined by a number of authors. In a series of papers, Diamond (1981; 1982a; 1982b; 1984) has studied this issue in depth. Diamond (1981) shows that in a market with a distribution of match specific mobility costs, an unemployment insurance programme can improve the ex ante welfare of all workers by inducing each of them to forego opportunities with high mobility costs. Diamond (1982b) shows that in a market with no competition among agents, there are multiple equilibria, all of which are Pareto inefficient. The inefficiency occurs because no agent internalizes the value of his increased search activity to other searchers. Diamond and Maskin (1979; 1981), and Mortensen (1981; 1982a; 1982b) show in matching models that the characteristics of the inefficiencies in equilibrium depend upon the search technology. With the exception of Mortensen (1981), (1982a) none of these models allows for contemporaneous competition among searchers. Keywords: Nash Equilibrium; Unemployment Insurance; Social Planner; Unemployed Worker; Search Intensity (search for similar items in EconPapers) There are no downloads for this item, see the EconPapers FAQ for hints about obtaining it. Related works: Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:pal:palchp:978-1-349-10688-2_1 Ordering information: This item can be ordered from DOI: 10.1007/978-1-349-10688-2_1 Access Statistics for this chapter More chapters in Palgrave Macmillan Books from Palgrave Macmillan |
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