Is Unemployment Lower if Unions Bargain Over Employment?

Richard Layard and Stephen Nickell

Chapter 11 in Advances in the Theory and Measurement of Unemployment, 1990, pp 304-322 from Palgrave Macmillan

Abstract: Abstract Would there be more employment if unions bargained over employment, and not only over wages? Most economists seem to answer Yes:1 Proposition 1 If unions bargain over employment and wages, employment will be higher than if they bargain only over wages. Most economists also believe the following: Proposition 2 If unions bargain over employment and wages and are utilitarian and risk-averse, then ‘equilibrium employment is higher than in the equivalent competitive labour market’ (Oswald. 1985). So, in the eyes of many, bargaining over employment is a good thing.

Keywords: General Equilibrium; Demand Curve; Perfect Competition; Contract Curve; Representative Firm (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 1990
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Related works:
Journal Article: Is Unemployment Lower if Unions Bargain over Employment? (1990)
Working Paper: IS UNEMPLOYMENT LOWER IF UNIONS BARGAIN OVER EMPLOYMENT? (1988)
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DOI: 10.1007/978-1-349-10688-2_11

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