The Rivalrous Consonance Framework for Oligopoly Analysis

Robert E. Kuenne
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Robert E. Kuenne: Princeton University

Chapter 8 in General Equilibrium Economics, 1992, pp 191-213 from Palgrave Macmillan

Abstract: Abstract Oligopoly theory occupies a peculiar position in economic analysis. On the one hand, lavish theoretical attention is bestowed upon it in the form of game-theoretic and bargaining models, entry-barrier theory, and core theory.1 Yet the ghosts of Cournot, Bertrand, Edgeworth, and Stackelberg process and equilibrium analysis continue to parade through the pages of textbooks, frequently updated to relate them to Nash or core equilibrium concepts.

Keywords: General Equilibrium; Power Structure; Target Rate; Price Decision; Simulative Theorize (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 1992
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DOI: 10.1007/978-1-349-12752-8_9

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