International Regulation of the Wildlife Trade: Rent Appropriation and Biodiversity Conservation

Timothy Swanson

Chapter 8 in The International Regulation of Extinction, 1994, pp 200-228 from Palgrave Macmillan

Abstract: Abstract Ultimately, state investments into the management of diverse resources will be constrained by the benefits that such investments are able to generate. International intervention that is based upon the direct inducement of further state investments in diverse resources will be similarly constrained. However, there are instances in which external regulation of the resource (i.e. in its product markets rather than its place of production) will yield greater returns per unit of investment. In that case, it may be optimal for the global community to utilise the instrument of external market regulation, generating supplier-state benefits through such intervention in consumer-state markets.

Keywords: International Regulation; Resource Rent; African Elephant; Wildlife Resource; Wildlife Trade (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 1994
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:pal:palchp:978-1-349-12985-0_8

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DOI: 10.1007/978-1-349-12985-0_8

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