 ConclusionChapter 13 in The Economic Foundations of Government, 1994, pp 210-223 from Palgrave Macmillan Abstract: Abstract The institutions of government are the product of exchange. Individuals perceive opportunities to enhance their welfare by bargaining with others to agree to an institutional structure which provides a well-defined and stable set of rules under which individuals interact. The product of this agreement is a constitution, and the preceding chapters discussed why it is in the interests of individuals to participate in the bargaining process, what terms of agreement would be expected to be found in the resulting constitution, and gave a broad outline explaining how the government produced by the constitution would be expected to operate. For the most part, the analysis was positive in nature, describing how agreement takes place and what emerges from agreement, without passing judgment on the desirability of the resulting agreement. The last several chapters, however, extended the positive analysis to normative issues in an attempt to determine how individuals might identify desirable institutions and constitutional rules. Keywords: Public Good; Monetary Policy; Exchange Model; Optimal Taxation; Constitutional Rule (search for similar items in EconPapers) There are no downloads for this item, see the EconPapers FAQ for hints about obtaining it. Related works: Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:pal:palchp:978-1-349-13230-0_13 Ordering information: This item can be ordered from DOI: 10.1007/978-1-349-13230-0_13 Access Statistics for this chapter More chapters in Palgrave Macmillan Books from Palgrave Macmillan |
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