Chapter 8 in A Guide to United Kingdom and European Union Competition Policy, 1996, pp 167-181 from Palgrave Macmillan
Abstract As the previous chapter has shown, the competition authorities are in principle prepared to regulate transactions between suppliers and consumers when the market power of suppliers puts consumer at a disadvantage. The functions of intermediaries between supplier and consumer raise further issues when those functions go beyond that of competing freely in the provision of services to consumers. Competition issues arise, for example, when the intermediaries themselves acquire market power, or when they are used to enhance the market power of suppliers. Under effects-based policies, however, the consequences for competition have to be balanced against any associated gains in efficiency and quality of service.
Keywords: Fair Trading; Competition Authority; Resale Price Maintenance; Resale Price; Selective Distribution (search for similar items in EconPapers)
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations: Track citations by RSS feed
There are no downloads for this item, see the EconPapers FAQ for hints about obtaining it.
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.
Export reference: BibTeX
RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan)
Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:pal:palchp:978-1-349-13672-8_8
Ordering information: This item can be ordered from
Access Statistics for this chapter
More chapters in Palgrave Macmillan Books from Palgrave Macmillan
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Sonal Shukla () and Springer Nature Abstracting and Indexing ().