Collusive Oligopoly

A. Koutsoyiannis
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A. Koutsoyiannis: University of Waterloo

Chapter 10 in Modern Microeconomics, 1975, pp 237-254 from Palgrave Macmillan

Abstract: Abstract One way of avoiding the uncertainty arising from oligopolistic interdependence is to enter into collusive agreements. There are two main types of collusion, cartels and price leadership. Both forms generally imply tacit (secret) agreements, since open collusive action is commonly illegal in most countries at present.

Keywords: Small Firm; Demand Curve; Monopoly Price; Dominant Firm; Cartel Negotiation (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 1975
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DOI: 10.1007/978-1-349-15603-0_10

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