The Separation of Ownership from Control

P. J. Curwen

Chapter Chapter 15 in The Theory of the Firm, 1976, pp 103-111 from Palgrave Macmillan

Abstract: Abstract There exist a number of theories which set out to explain the devices used to control corporations. Some amongst them, such as the theory of ‘People’s Capitalism’ which claims that ownership, and hence control, is vested in the large numbers of ordinary people who own shares, and the theory of the ‘Corporate Rich’ which claims that control is vested in a coalition of the old propertied rich and the new managerial classes,1 have never really caught on. Two other theories, however, are worthy of note; the first claims that control is vested in financial intermediaries of all kinds such as banks and unit trusts,2 while the second claims that control is vested in the management of the corporation itself.

Keywords: Management Control; Profit Maximisation; Stock Option; Executive Compensation; Vote Share (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 1976
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations:

There are no downloads for this item, see the EconPapers FAQ for hints about obtaining it.

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:pal:palchp:978-1-349-15645-0_15

Ordering information: This item can be ordered from
http://www.palgrave.com/9781349156450

DOI: 10.1007/978-1-349-15645-0_15

Access Statistics for this chapter

More chapters in Palgrave Macmillan Books from Palgrave Macmillan
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Sonal Shukla () and Springer Nature Abstracting and Indexing ().