 Foreign Exchange Dealers, the Domestic Money Market and Stabilising SpeculationChapter 3 in International Monetary Problems and Supply-Side Economics, 1986, pp 28-55 from Palgrave Macmillan Abstract: Abstract In the absence of intervention by central banks, is private speculation in the foreign exchanges likely to stabilise the exchange rate? Many writers in the 1950s and 1960s reacted negatively to Milton Friedman’s (1953) seminal suggestion that speculators, if they were not to lose money, must on average buy when the price of foreign exchange is low and sell when it is high thereby stabilising the market.1 But Harry Johnson (1976, p. 101) summarised the outcome of this debate in favour of Friedman: The critics have, however, in the judgment of those who have studied the matter, failed to make their case: their counterexamples have implicity either selected arbitrarily a small group of especially clever destabilizing speculators who make money at the expense of other destabilizing speculators (the whole group losing in total), or imputed to destabilizing speculators profits that are not realised — and could not be realized — through market closures of the speculation [see Telser, 1959]. Yet there remains uneasiness about Friedman’s result. Keywords: Exchange Rate; Foreign Exchange; Domestic Currency; Financial Wealth; Cash Balance (search for similar items in EconPapers) There are no downloads for this item, see the EconPapers FAQ for hints about obtaining it. Related works: Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:pal:palchp:978-1-349-18392-0_3 Ordering information: This item can be ordered from DOI: 10.1007/978-1-349-18392-0_3 Access Statistics for this chapter More chapters in Palgrave Macmillan Books from Palgrave Macmillan |
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