Corporate Governance and Market Structure

Robert Willig

Chapter 13 in Economic Policy in Theory and Practice, 1987, pp 481-503 from Palgrave Macmillan

Abstract: Abstract It is an element of the conventional wisdom that product market competition disciplines firms into efficiency of operation, while market power fosters managerial sloth and x-inefficiency. In this view, movements in the market away from monopoly towards competition are doubly advantageous to social welfare. They decrease deadweight social losses in the product market while, at the same time, eliminating wasted resources and unnecessary costs internal to the firms.

Keywords: Corporate Governance; Product Market; Consumer Surplus; Incentive Scheme; Competitive Pressure (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 1987
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DOI: 10.1007/978-1-349-18584-9_13

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