International Migration and Institutional Competition: An Application of Hayek’s Evolutionary Theory

Patrick Welter

Chapter 5 in Competition among Institutions, 1995, pp 119-151 from Palgrave Macmillan

Abstract: Abstract In the last decade, the number of migrants on the international level, especially migrants to western welfare states, has increased to unforeseen heights. The United States has experienced a level of legal immigration unseen since the beginning of the century, and the number of illegal immigrants to the US is supposed to have increased as well. Due to liberal asylum laws, asylum-seekers have flooded Western Europe, which has been exacerbated by an influx of immigrants from post-communist countries. As legal immigration is restricted, unregulated immigration takes place, to a large part, under the guise of asylum-seeking, especially in the European states. There are worries that these huge migration flows will be detrimental to western wealth, and that they will prove inefficient worldwide. Therefore, governments are trying to tighten immigration laws, especially in the field of asylum policy. They find support from economists, who propose an international migration order to control migration and to co-ordinate migration policies. Analogous to the GATT, this proposal is named GAMP, the General Agreement on Migration Policies. It should provide rules of entry permission, rules of exit permission, rules of taxing migration, treatment of foreign labour, and other migration aspects which have to be fixed within this multilateral agreement (remittances, transfers, social rights, pension transfers etc.).1 The assumption behind the proposal is that unregulated migration is inherently inefficient. Pareto-efficiency, it is argued, would dictate a coordinated regulation of migration.2 However, policy coordination always includes the danger of governmental policy cartelization in order to escape from institutional competition. This must be considered when analyzing the GAMP proposal.

Keywords: International Migration; Group Selection; Immigration Policy; Public Capital; Migration Policy (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 1995
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:pal:palchp:978-1-349-24262-7_5

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DOI: 10.1007/9781349242627_5

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