Governance of the Fund

Alexandre Kafka

Chapter 13 in The International Monetary and Financial System, 1996, pp 324-343 from Palgrave Macmillan

Abstract: Abstract The division between (a) Fund members expected to dispense with the Fund’s services as a financial intermediary or provider of a ‘good house-keeping’ seal of approval to catalyse other lenders and (b) other countries, (developing countries and more recently, former Soviet Union and Central European countries) has decisively reduced the institution’s influence over the former group of countries. The Fund’s analytical competence and the information which it can supply could restore its lost influence over the former group of member countries. This purpose could be promoted by improvements in Fund organs and through the intensified exchange of senior staff between the Fund and member countries.

Keywords: Central Bank; Executive Director; Member Country; Vote Power; Exchange Rate Change (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 1996
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:pal:palchp:978-1-349-24414-0_13

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DOI: 10.1007/978-1-349-24414-0_13

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