 Commitment and Efficiency in Research Joint VenturesRune Stenbacka and Mihkel M. Tombak Chapter 8 in Competition, Cooperation, Research and Development, 1997, pp 138-158 from Palgrave Macmillan Abstract: Abstract Competition policy in most industrial countries allows for and even encourages research joint ventures. A research joint venture (RJV) is a contractural arrangement whereby the partners share in the costs and benefits of the research. RJVs are a way in which research funds can be leveraged and a way to mitigate appropriability problems associated with the public goods aspect of the knowledge created through research. The contractual agreements which form the basis of RJVs can take a number of forms. These agreements can irreversibly specify the allocation over time of the outlays of the resources of the partners. Alternatively, RJVs can be based on flexible agreements where the funding is subject to periodic review by the partners. In this chapter we study how the investments of RJVs in cost-reducing R&D are affected by the degrees of commitment implied by the contractual arrangements. We also investigate the main implications for the cost efficiency of the industry as well as the corresponding welfare effect. Keywords: Nash Equilibrium; Consumer Surplus; Investment Level; Total Welfare; Contractual Arrangement (search for similar items in EconPapers) There are no downloads for this item, see the EconPapers FAQ for hints about obtaining it. Related works: Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:pal:palchp:978-1-349-25814-7_8 Ordering information: This item can be ordered from DOI: 10.1007/978-1-349-25814-7_8 Access Statistics for this chapter More chapters in Palgrave Macmillan Books from Palgrave Macmillan |
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