The State as an Interest Group: The Economic Logic of Wielding Power

Hans C. Blomqvist and Mats Lundahl

Chapter 12 in The Distorted Economy, 2002, pp 199-223 from Palgrave Macmillan

Abstract: Abstract As we have seen in the preceding chapters, government interventions in the market tend to create distortions and excess profits, which special interests try to capture. There are also incentives for various groups in the economy to join forces and try to secure favours by persuading the state to introduce distorting policy measures.

Keywords: Private Sector; Public Sector; Interest Group; Public Choice; National Income (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2002
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations:

There are no downloads for this item, see the EconPapers FAQ for hints about obtaining it.

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:pal:palchp:978-1-4039-1434-7_12

Ordering information: This item can be ordered from
http://www.palgrave.com/9781403914347

DOI: 10.1057/9781403914347_12

Access Statistics for this chapter

More chapters in Palgrave Macmillan Books from Palgrave Macmillan
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Sonal Shukla () and Springer Nature Abstracting and Indexing ().