 Introduction and SummaryIra M. Millstein and Paul W. MacAvoy Chapter 1 in The Recurrent Crisis in Corporate Governance, 2003, pp 1-5 from Palgrave Macmillan Abstract: Abstract With fits and starts, the current governance crisis has been 30 years in the making. The decline in performance of the over-diversified, overstaffed corporation in the 1980s was marked, and blamed on management that was essentially ungoverned. A round of firings of management followed, accompanied by the creation of independent, active boards of directors. Governance reform was thought to be evolving in the late 1990s as the American corporation forged ahead in efficiency and earnings performance with strong response in stock price appreciation. No more was the imperial Chief Executive Officer (CEO) to be criticized for ignoring the rightful returns of investors; but the scandals of Enron and others, and the bursting of the bubble in stock prices of Internet, telecom and energy company shares, has caused those of us involved with the corporate enterprise to take another look. While we thought governance had reached an enviable pinnacle of excellence, at least in form, we came to realize that it had not, in substance. Substantive governance simply had not followed structural reforms. Keywords: Corporate Governance; Chief Executive Officer; Good Faith; Board Structure; Governance Reform (search for similar items in EconPapers) There are no downloads for this item, see the EconPapers FAQ for hints about obtaining it. Related works: Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:pal:palchp:978-1-4039-4688-1_1 Ordering information: This item can be ordered from Access Statistics for this chapter More chapters in Palgrave Macmillan Books from Palgrave Macmillan |
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