Management and Communication of Monetary Policy

William Allen

Chapter 15 in Monetary Policy and Financial Repression in Britain, 1951–59, 2014, pp 194-217 from Palgrave Macmillan

Abstract: Abstract Throughout the 1950s (and until 1997), the Chancellor of the Exchequer had extensive, though not complete, discretion over monetary policy, if he chose to use it, by virtue of the Bank of England Act of 1946. The Labour Chancellors of 1945–51 did so choose. Dalton, Cripps and Gaitskell knew exactly what monetary policy they wanted, and by and large they got it, even if it conflicted with the Bank of England’s advice.

Keywords: Monetary Policy; Central Bank; Prime Minister; Federal Open Market Committee; Bank Rate (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2014
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:pal:palscp:978-1-137-38382-2_15

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DOI: 10.1057/9781137383822_15

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