Issuing Money

Stefano Ugolini

Chapter 4 in The Evolution of Central Banking: Theory and History, 2017, pp 165-206 from Palgrave Macmillan

Abstract: Abstract The emergence of money is the result of the presence of frictions. In a “hybrid” economy where both centralized and decentralized transactions coexist, the debt issued by “central” agents can play the role of money for “peripheral” ones. “Peripheral” agents’ demand for some particular types of credit money can actually be increased by government, either through legal restrictions or through market power. Historically, the monetization of public debt has been one important yet not exclusive motivation for government intervention in the field: government-sponsored money creation has also been collateralized by private debt in most instances (e.g. in medieval Venice, in nineteenth-century England, and in the original design of the Federal Reserve). This is also overwhelmingly the case today.

Keywords: Governmental Debt; Debt Monetization; Neapolitan Banks; circulationCirculation; coinsCoins (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2017
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:pal:palscp:978-1-137-48525-0_4

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DOI: 10.1057/978-1-137-48525-0_4

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