 The Business Model of the One-Galleon SystemJuan José Rivas Moreno ()
Chapter Chapter 4 in The Capital Market of Manila and the Pacific Trade, 1668-1838, 2024, pp 133-156 from Palgrave Macmillan Abstract: Abstract The large profits of the Pacific exchange were the result of the monopsomonopsonicnic nature of the market for MexicoMexican peso-minted pesos, whose demand was global but their supply was limited to the mint in MexicoMexico (city) City. This skewed the bargaining power in the Pacific exchange in favour of the wealthy wholesalersMexican wholesalers of Mexico that could control the supply of inputs into the mines and the flow of pesos within New SpainNew Spain, allowing them to become price setters in the international fairs. Manileños, unable to operate beyond the Mexican cartelcartel, sought for ways to minimise its impact and prop up prices. Their response was the limiting of the volume of the trade and the creation of a mirror cartelcartelsellers' to operate in the AcapulcoAcapulcoAcapulco Fair fair. The one-Galleon systemone-Galleon system became a business model through which Manila merchants could enforce their cartel and minimise the disruptions that could result from crossing the largest ocean in the world. Keywords: Market structure; Cartels; Hold-ups; Profit margins (search for similar items in EconPapers) There are no downloads for this item, see the EconPapers FAQ for hints about obtaining it. Related works: Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:pal:palscp:978-3-031-71810-6_4 Ordering information: This item can be ordered from DOI: 10.1007/978-3-031-71810-6_4 Access Statistics for this chapter More chapters in Palgrave Studies in Economic History from Palgrave Macmillan |
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