A Game Theoretical Analysis of Source Allocation in the Early Modern Ottoman Empire Under Contractual Relationships: Case of Thessaloniki Customs

Hande Nur Kırmızıkuşak () and Özgür Hakan Aydoğmuş ()
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Hande Nur Kırmızıkuşak: Yalova University
Özgür Hakan Aydoğmuş: Social Sciences University of Ankara

Chapter Chapter 8 in Revenue-Raising Institutions, State Organization and Economic Change in the Early Modern Ottoman Empire, 2025, pp 111-135 from Palgrave Macmillan

Abstract: Abstract Substantial scholarly literature on tax collection mechanisms in early modern societies has emerged over the past few decades. This body of work can be examined by using two primary lenses.

Date: 2025
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:pal:palscp:978-3-031-96492-3_8

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DOI: 10.1007/978-3-031-96492-3_8

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