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Coordination and ConflictConflict: A Game-Theoretic Assessment on the Fiscal Capacity Through Tax-Farming Contracts in the Early Modern Ottoman Empire

Bora Altay () and Erkan Gürpınar ()
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Bora Altay: Ankara Yıldırım Beyazıt University
Erkan Gürpınar: Social Sciences University of Ankara

Chapter Chapter 9 in Revenue-Raising Institutions, State Organization and Economic Change in the Early Modern Ottoman Empire, 2025, pp 137-166 from Palgrave Macmillan

Abstract: Abstract The development of fiscal capacityfiscal capacity is a critical aspect of state-building in history, as it determines a state’s ability to mobilize resources for public goods, warfare, and administrative governance. Among the various fiscal strategies adopted by the early modern states, tax farming has emerged as a widely implemented mechanism for ensuring revenue collection.

Date: 2025
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:pal:palscp:978-3-031-96492-3_9

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DOI: 10.1007/978-3-031-96492-3_9

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