State-led Growth and Domestic Debts

Yazhuo Zheng and Kent Deng
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Yazhuo Zheng: Beijing Enlightenment Institute for Economic and Social Research
Kent Deng: London School of Economics

Chapter 7 in State Failure and Distorted Urbanisation in Post-Mao's China, 1993–2012, 2018, pp 123-133 from Palgrave Macmillan

Abstract: Abstract This chapter deals with China’s trap in a mounting debt burdendebt burden , especially why and how government debts grow so fast. Beijing’s single-minded policy of pushing for GDP growth has created incentives for bureaucrats and cadres to initiate novel ways to generate more and more GDP for personal deeds. Projects best suited for government are land-intensive, capital-intensivecapital-intensive but relatively low-tech city-building ones. Local governments then need money. They cash coffers from land leases and hoard newly nationalised land a collateral whereby money loans to be made from state-owned banks. As their investment returns are too low to pay off debts, many local governments face bankruptcy.

Keywords: Soft-budget constraint; Domestic debts; Land nationalisation; Land lease fee; State-owned banks; Tax revenue; Debt-reversion policy; Minsky Moment (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2018
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DOI: 10.1007/978-3-319-92168-6_7

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