Competition and Collusion

Alexander Donges
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Alexander Donges: University of Mannheim

Chapter 21 in An Economist’s Guide to Economic History, 2018, pp 175-183 from Palgrave Macmillan

Abstract: Abstract The preservation of competitive markets is a major cornerstone of modern economic policy. Cartels and anti-competitive practices are restricted, and competition authorities control mergers to avoid the excessive accumulation of market power. This chapter demonstrates that historical evidence is important to understand why cartels arise and how they work. It argues that the study of historical cartels from periods before the introduction of effective competition laws is necessary to understand how competition affects innovation and growth in the long run.

JEL-codes: L40 L41 M21 N10 N40 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2018
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:pal:palscp:978-3-319-96568-0_21

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DOI: 10.1007/978-3-319-96568-0_21

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