 Virtue, or Self-Government in Decision MakingAndrew M. Yuengert Chapter Chapter 6 in Approximating Prudence, 2012, pp 95-119 from Palgrave Macmillan Abstract: Abstract The previous two chapters identified two blind spots in the optimization account of choice. Chapter 4 explored the nature of the objectives that motivate human action. Chapter 5 addressed the contingency that faces decision makers, contrasting it with uncertainty in economics. Although the Aristotelian treatment of contingency in Chapter 5 brings into play certain crucial virtues, we have not yet fully explored the nature of virtue in this tradition, and its implications for formal models of choice. The virtues are not simply states of mind, or preexisting abilities to handle uncertainty and to make decisions; they are habits that can be developed through repetition, and that can erode through neglect. The virtues introduce a complexity into decision making—a potential disconnect between the objectives of action and the motivation to pursue those objectives, between the objectives of action and the intellect’s ability to recognize those objectives. Economics is beginning to develop concepts with which it can address, intriguingly if incompletely, the role of the virtues in decision making. Keywords: Human Capital; Behavioral Economic; Practical Wisdom; Moral Virtue; Internal Conflict (search for similar items in EconPapers) There are no downloads for this item, see the EconPapers FAQ for hints about obtaining it. Related works: Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:pal:pfschp:978-1-137-06317-5_6 Ordering information: This item can be ordered from Access Statistics for this chapter More chapters in Perspectives from Social Economics from Palgrave Macmillan |
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