Central Bank Independence and Accountability: a Trade-off

Noël K. Tshiani

Chapter 2 in Building Credible Central Banks, 2008, pp 10-57 from Palgrave Macmillan

Abstract: Abstract The case for a credible and independent central bank is becoming increasingly accepted. This new orthodoxy is based on three foundations: the success of the Bundesbank and the German economy over the past 50 years and its successor, the European Central Bank; the theoretical academic literature on the inflationary bias of discretionary policy-making; and the empirical academic literature on central bank independence. The purpose of this chapter is to examine whether this accepted concept of independence can be traded off and balanced with a reasonable degree of accountability for a central bank in an emerging democracy such as the Democratic Republic of the Congo.

Keywords: Interest Rate; Monetary Policy; Central Bank; Fiscal Policy; Federal Reserve (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2008
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:pal:pmschp:978-0-230-59425-8_2

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DOI: 10.1057/9780230594258_2

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