Conclusion

Noël K. Tshiani

A chapter in Building Credible Central Banks, 2008, pp 129-131 from Palgrave Macmillan

Abstract: Abstract Of key importance to the effective operation of the Central Bank of the Congo within the government are: a well-designed policy mandate; a high degree of formal instrument independence; complementary informal relationships to ensure appropriate coordination without undermining instrument independence; a disciplined, regular process of legislative oversight; and a high degree of transparency and disclosure. The result would be a good trade-off among government-mandated objectives, instrument independence, flexibility, and accountability. But this very same trade-off may leave open opportunities for political interference and continuing energy and focus will be required – both inside the Central Bank of the Congo and within the rest of government – to sustain the operational autonomy and independence of the central bank.

Keywords: Central Bank; Democratic Republic; Price Stability; Central Bank Independence; Operational Autonomy (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2008
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:pal:pmschp:978-0-230-59425-8_8

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DOI: 10.1057/9780230594258_8

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