Exit Mechanisms in Banking

Violaine Cousin

Chapter 3 in Banking in China, 2007, pp 39-45 from Palgrave Macmillan

Abstract: Abstract As mentioned by Wu Xiaoling in an interview (Ye W. and Hu J., 2006), the banking industry in China needs a functioning and efficient exit mechanism: “In a market economy, only if there is a pressure to exit a market, there is a good incentive for operations; [the pressure] improves the healthiness of operations of financial institutions, optimizes the allocation of financial resources, and protects the system from financial instability.”

Keywords: Financial Institution; Moral Hazard; Deposit Insurance; Market Discipline; Moral Hazard Problem (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2007
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:pal:pmschp:978-0-230-59584-2_3

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DOI: 10.1057/9780230595842_3

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