Non-executive Independent Directors in Corporate Governance of the Italian Banks and Listed Companies

Domenico Siclari ()

Chapter 7 in Italian Banking and Financial Law, 2015, pp 155-183 from Palgrave Macmillan

Abstract: Abstract Given the close correlation between corporate governance and financial stability, shown by the 2007–2008 great financial crisis, new corporate governance rules for banks and financial intermediaries aim to regulate the composition of company boards. It is now required, in particular, the appointment of non-executive independent directors to define and solve the problem of board loyalty, especially in cases of conflicts of interest.

Keywords: Corporate Governance; Supra Note; Independent Director; Audit Committee; Minority Shareholder (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2015
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations:

There are no downloads for this item, see the EconPapers FAQ for hints about obtaining it.

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:pal:pmschp:978-1-137-50762-4_7

Ordering information: This item can be ordered from
http://www.palgrave.com/9781137507624

DOI: 10.1057/9781137507624_7

Access Statistics for this chapter

More chapters in Palgrave Macmillan Studies in Banking and Financial Institutions from Palgrave Macmillan
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Sonal Shukla () and Springer Nature Abstracting and Indexing ().