The Protection of Independence and Discretion

Pierluigi Ciocca
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Pierluigi Ciocca: Accademia Nazionale dei Lincei

Chapter 11 in Stabilising Capitalism, 2015, pp 60-66 from Palgrave Macmillan

Abstract: Abstract The problem therefore becomes how to safeguard the independence and discretion of central banks, as herein defined, justified, and delimited.

Keywords: Monetary Policy; Central Bank; Financial System; Euro Area; European Central Banking (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2015
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:pal:pmschp:978-1-137-55551-9_11

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DOI: 10.1057/9781137555519_11

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