Discretion, not Rules

Pierluigi Ciocca
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Pierluigi Ciocca: Accademia Nazionale dei Lincei

Chapter 4 in Stabilising Capitalism, 2015, pp 21-23 from Palgrave Macmillan

Abstract: Abstract The specificity that we have outlined coincides with the independence of the central bank and with its discretion, at least of a technical nature. Independence and discretion are inherent features of the institution — a bank, not a bureaucratic body — entrusted with the management of money and credit. According to a strong formulation, “working to rule is the antithesis of central banking. A central bank is necessary only when the community decides that a discretionary element is desirable. (…) We are doomed to disappointment if we look for rules applicable to all times and all places. We have central banks for the very reason that there are no such rules”.1

Keywords: Monetary Policy; Central Bank; Deposit Insurance; Exchange Rate Policy; Quantity Theory (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2015
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:pal:pmschp:978-1-137-55551-9_4

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DOI: 10.1057/9781137555519_4

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