Why Do US Banks React Differently to Short Selling Bans?

Daniele Angelo Previati (), Giuseppe Galloppo, Mauro Aliano and Viktoriia Paimanova
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Daniele Angelo Previati: Bocconi University
Giuseppe Galloppo: University of Tuscia
Mauro Aliano: University of Cagliari
Viktoriia Paimanova: University of Tuscia

Chapter Chapter 5 in The Business of Banking, 2017, pp 79-108 from Palgrave Macmillan

Abstract: Abstract Financial crisis brought significant decreases in market indices, led to active selling of stocks, and raised the possibility of a total collapse. Short selling ban was expected to bring lower stock price volatility and raise investor’s confidence. In this context, a policy intervention can change the net expected present value of an individual bank, basically because such kind of interventions aims to reduce the speculative selling pressure on a single title stock, according to policy regulators. Consequently, it should calm down the price reduction and net expected present value of every single stock. Second, the intervention may reduce both volatility and probability of default of financial companies.

Date: 2017
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DOI: 10.1007/978-3-319-54894-4_5

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