Political Coalitions in Agricultural and Food Policies

Johan Swinnen

Chapter Chapter 2 in The Political Economy of Agricultural and Food Policies, 2018, pp 13-34 from Palgrave Macmillan

Abstract: Abstract Political economy models of agricultural and food policy often consider “producers”, “consumers”, and “taxpayers” as the main agents. One (theoretical) reason is its didactic use, that is, to avoid unnecessary complications in deriving policy effects and identify equilibria. Another (empirical) reason is the absence of disaggregated information of policy impacts on various agents within (or outside) the value chain. In reality many more agents play a role, such as input suppliers (such as land owners, seed and agro-chemical companies, or banks), traders, food processors, retail companies, environmental and food advocacy groups, and so on. These different agents have sometimes joined forces (“political coalitions”) with farmers or with final consumers to influence policy-makers in setting public policies. The coalitions are not static.

Date: 2018
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:pal:psachp:978-1-137-50102-8_2

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DOI: 10.1057/978-1-137-50102-8_2

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