Anti-Trade Bias and the Political Economy of Instrument Choice

Johan Swinnen

Chapter Chapter 5 in The Political Economy of Agricultural and Food Policies, 2018, pp 87-94 from Palgrave Macmillan

Abstract: Abstract Many political economy studies focus on explaining the level of policy intervention, but the explanation of the policy instruments is equally important since the distortionary effects are equally dependent on the choice of the instrument as on the level of the intervention. A stylized fact of agricultural and food policies is the anti-trade bias, the observation that import-competing sectors are often protected while exportable commodities are often taxed. This chapter documents these patterns and provides political economy explanations of the choice of policy instruments.

Date: 2018
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:pal:psachp:978-1-137-50102-8_5

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DOI: 10.1057/978-1-137-50102-8_5

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