 EnforcementSudha Narayanan ()
Chapter Chapter 10 in Contract Farming in Developing Countries, 2025, pp 147-173 from Palgrave Macmillan Abstract: Abstract Across developing countries, a chief problem with contract farming schemes stems from challenges in enforcing the contract. Weak public institutions for enforcement give latitude to both farmers and firms to renege on the contract and parties inevitably resort to various forms self-regulation and other private means of enforcement to maintain transactional relationships. This significant reliance on self-regulation shapes the very nature of contract farming and its trajectories in different contexts. This contested space where farmers and firms fashion the terms of their relationship is viewed variously as relationship maintenance or everyday forms of resistance by farmers. The chapter highlights that contractual relationships may be viewed more as relationships than as contracts, even as there are limits to how much self-regulation and relationship maintenance can support contractual performance. Keywords: Contractual performance; Breach; First party-; Second party-; Third party enforcement; Moral economy; Courts; Incomplete contracts; Complementarity; Substitutability; Handshake ethic (search for similar items in EconPapers) There are no downloads for this item, see the EconPapers FAQ for hints about obtaining it. Related works: Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:pal:psachp:978-3-031-76487-5_10 Ordering information: This item can be ordered from DOI: 10.1007/978-3-031-76487-5_10 Access Statistics for this chapter More chapters in Palgrave Studies in Agricultural Economics and Food Policy from Palgrave Macmillan |
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