NGOs Nonmarket Strategies and Corruption: A Co-evolutionary Perspective

Adamoglou Xanthippe () and Dimitrios Kyrkilis
Additional contact information
Adamoglou Xanthippe: University of Macedonia
Dimitrios Kyrkilis: University of Macedonia

Chapter Chapter 11 in Non-Profit Organisations, Volume IV, 2024, pp 255-281 from Palgrave Macmillan

Abstract: Abstract The paper examines how the complementarity between internal and external MNEs nonmarket agent strategies affects the corruption level of the Turkish economy until institutional change is achieved. The paper applies co-evolutionary theory and emphasizes Non-Government Institutions (NGOs) as a particular case of Multinational Enterprises (MNEs). The one-way ANOVA statistical method is applied. Results indicate that, among the three selected NGOs nonmarket agent strategies, the highest corruption mitigation is achieved when institutional borrowing signals Joint Ventures, or NGOs succumb to co-evolution. The moderate and lowest reductions of corruption are achieved when institutional borrowing signals non-equity and Wholly Owned Subsidiaries, or NGOs succumb to co-evolution and institutional adaptation, respectively.

Date: 2024
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations:

There are no downloads for this item, see the EconPapers FAQ for hints about obtaining it.

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:pal:pscchp:978-3-031-62538-1_11

Ordering information: This item can be ordered from
http://www.palgrave.com/9783031625381

DOI: 10.1007/978-3-031-62538-1_11

Access Statistics for this chapter

More chapters in Palgrave Studies in Cross-disciplinary Business Research, In Association with EuroMed Academy of Business from Palgrave Macmillan
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Sonal Shukla () and Springer Nature Abstracting and Indexing ().